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Abstract: In the paper we discuss how to share the secrets, that are graphs. So, far secret 
sharing schemes were designed to work with numbers. As the first step, we 
propose conditions for “graph to number” conversion methods. Hence, the 
existing schemes can be used, without weakening their properties. Next, we 
show how graph properties can be used to extend capabilities of secret sharing 
schemes. This leads to proposal of using such properties for number based 
secret sharing.  
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Graphs find applications in every field of computer science. Graph theory provides 
many NP class problems (see [9]) , so it is not surprising that they find applications 
in cryptography and data security. Problem of building graph based security 
protocols was outlined in [12]. In the following paper authors discuss more specific 
problem of secret sharing protocols for graphs.  
 Everybody knows situations, where permission to trigger certain action requires 
approval of several selected entities. Equally important is that any other set of 
entities cannot trigger the action. Secret sharing allows to split a secret into different 
pieces, called shares, which are given to the participants, such that only certain 
group (authorized set of participants) can recover the secret.  
Secret sharing schemes (SSS) were independently invented by George Blakley [2] 
and Adi Shamir [20]. Many schemes have been presented since, for instance, 
Asmuth and Bloom [1], Brickell [4], Karin-Greene-Hellman (KGH) [7]. Once secret 
sharing was introduced, people started to develop extended capabilities. Some of 
examples are: detection of cheaters and secret consistency verification (e.g., [18], 
[19], [21]), multi-secret threshold schemes (e.g., [18]), pre-positioned secret sharing 
schemes (e.g., [18]). The other class of extended capabilities focuses on anonymity, 
randomness and automatization for secret sharing procedures (e.g. [11]). 
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All of the mentioned above schemes were designed to work on the secret that is a 
number. As long as secret sharing was only toy for mathematicians, it did not pose a 
problem. In real-life applications secrets that are different then numbers are often 
found. Many of them can be seen as having structure of the graphs, for instance, 
consider complex structures like bio-chemical molecules or VSLI design (e.g. [10]). 
Such objects contain much more information that is given by simple formula. Such 
additional information can be often understood as graph related problem, e.g. 
finding optimal VSLI design is equivalent to finding minimal vertex coloring for 
some graph, see [10].  
In the field of secret sharing, graphs were applied while studying access structures, 
for instance by Blundo, De Santis, Stinson and Vaccaro [3]. Although significant 
results were obtained, the role of the graphs was limited to modeling the data 
structures. Graphs provide variety of interesting properties, many of them resulting 
in the problems of NP class (e.g., [9]). At least few of these seem to be handy in 
secret sharing, especially for extended capabilities. When sharing the graph related 
secret, one has to consider two situations (or combination of them): 
− sharing the graph structure, 
− sharing graph properties (e.g. coloring), independently of graph structure. 
Our approach is to find way to share graphs secrets using already available methods. 
In addition the graph being the subject of the protocol provides some benefits. One 
instance comes in the field of extended capabilities, while we other is more general. 
In fact, graph based secret sharing protocols result in the situation where one 
abstract type simultaneously underlies and models the protocol. This, in turn, allows 
one to see interaction of the protocol parts in a new light. 
We propose conditions that should be fulfilled, to convert graph into number in 
order to apply existing secret sharing schemes. Once conversion is done, the graph 
properties hold for resulting number. In the Section 2 we will establish conversion 
conditions. This is followed by the example of conversion method in the next 
section. The Section 4 is devoted to problems of sharing graph properties, like vertex 
coloring. In the following section, few of the graph properties, useful for extended 
capabilities, are listed. In the Section 6 we deal with opposite situation, conversion 
of numbers into graphs in order to make use of graph based extended capabilities.  
The paper is summarized with conclusions and information on further research. 
 2. PRELIMINARIES 
Notation: 
Let  be the graph, where V  is set of vertices and  is set of edges, with ( EVG , ) E
E  edges and V  vertices,  denotes iiv th vertex of the graph, . Graph 
 will be referred as G  to simplify the notation. χ(G) is chromatic number 
for the graph G
Vvi ∈
( )EV ,G
. 
Define: ( ) mGM =  is conversion function that takes graph G  and returns number ,  m
( ) GmM ='  is the inverse of conversion function ; ( )GM
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m  is the length of the number m . 
 The ultimate goal is to state conditions for , such that, once  is converted 
into , existing secret sharing schemes can be used. In addition, secret sharing 
scheme should not be weaken, even if  is made public. We start the discussion 
from case of sharing graph structure. 
( )GM
)G
G
m (M
In order to share the graph structure, it is required for conversion function  to 
have the following properties: 
( )GM
− be injective (one-to-one), 
−  and  should be easy to compute, ( )GM ( )mM '
− preferably be surjective (onto) the secret space of the secret sharing scheme. 
The purpose of the last requirement is to maintain information theoretical properties 
of the secret sharing scheme (e.g. perfectness , see [18], [19]). Discussion on 
relaxation of that requirement will be carried out in the Section 3.4.  
Let ( )VΓ  be the number of all possible graphs having V  vertices. In other words, 
( )VΓ  represents number of binary sequences such that every bit corresponds to the 
possible edge in the V  vertices graph (1 denotes presence of the edge, 0 otherwise). 
It is well known that ( ) ( )2 12 −=Γ VVV . Information contained in such string is 
sufficient to determine a graph. It can be seen as the special case of Goedel's 
numbering, see [5]. In the proposed approach all  fall into this category.  ( )GM
The knowledge of the graph structure, does not automatically yield all properties of 
the graph. In fact finding some of them can be the problem of NP class, see [9], [17]. 
In order to share graph properties, similar conditions apply.  In addition, it is 
required that the inverse of that function yields information concerning only that 
property. It should support “non-disclosure rule”. It means not to provide more 
information on the graph, than resulting from the information on that property.  As 
the result sharing graph properties can be separated from sharing the graph structure. 
This allows to consider sharing secret (graph property) in two modes:  
− when graphs structure is not known; 
− when graph structure is known. 
The second case is interesting when shared property belongs to the hard problems 
(see [9], [17], [10]). In the opposite case it would be easy to derive from the graph 
structure, hence treating it as the secret and sharing would be rather useless. Even if 
the property belongs to the class of difficult problems (say NP-complete), the proper 
care should be taken, whether the particular instance is not easily computable.  
In the section 4 we give an illustrative example for sharing vertex coloring of the 
graph. Discussion of “non-disclosure rule” for that case will be also provided. 
 3. EXAMPLE OF CONVERSION METHOD 
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At the beginning simple scheme that allows conversion between graphs and numbers 
is presented. The conversion will be performed in two steps. First graph will be 
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converted into the matrix, next matrix will be converted into the number. While 
more sophisticated methods can be used (e.g. [9]), the one chosen is a handy 
illustrative example. 
 3.1 Graph description 
Graph G is described by the square adjacency matrix . The 
elements of A satisfy:  
mjiaij ,...,2,1,],[ ==A
for ,  if  (vertices vji ≠ 1=ija Evv ji ∈ i, vj are connected by an edge) and , 
otherwise; 
0=ija
for , , where  is the number of color assigned to vji =
(Gχ
α=iia) k
Z∈α i. In Zk , 
 denotes the number of colors that can be used to color vertices of G (in 
other words, k
k ≥
 is the size of the color palette).  
In case that the graph coloring is not considered, k=1, and all entries on A’s main 
diagonal are zero.  
Remark 1 
An adjacency matrix A determines the graph G. The opposite is not true. By 
permuting vertices of G a variety of adjacency matrices can be produced. Hence 
additional information has to be provided to enforce injective property of the 
mapping .  One of the possibilities is to fix order of  G‘s vertices. ( )GM
Example 1  
Take the graph G with 4 vertices, colored with 3 colors:  
 
The adjacency matrix of the graph G (only the graph structure, no colors) is 
presented on the left hand side, while the whole adjacency matrix A with encoded 
coloring is given on the right hand side. 
0101
1011
0100
1100
4
3
2
1
4321
v
v
v
v
vvvv
           
1101
1211
0100
1100
4
3
2
1
4321
v
v
v
v
vvvv
■ 
 Coloring and the chromatic number are integral properties of any graph. Given the 
graph G , it is always possible to find its chromatic number and n-coloring.  
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 3.2  Coding the matrix A  
A is a symmetric matrix, hence having all the entries on the main diagonal and all 
the entries below main diagonal, one can describe whole matrix (and as the result 
graph G). Thus, it can be written as the sequence a21a31a32a41a42a43 ... am(m-1)a11 a22 
...amm, where the first part (a21a31a32a41a42a43 ... am(m-1)) corresponds to all the entries 
below main diagonal (graph structure), while the second (a11 a22 ...amm) to the main 
diagonal itself (the coloring).  
Example 1 (continuation)  
Coding matrix A we obtain  
1200101110
44332211434241323121 aaaaaaaaaa
 
which yields  m=0111010021  
■ 
 3.3  Coding the number as the graph 
This can be done by converting number into binary form. Then the adjacency matrix 
A is encoded in the same way as depicted in the section 3.1. If the length l of binary 
number does not yield integer solution to the equation 
2
)1( mm −=l , then lacking 
matrix entries can be added. 
 3.4  Final remarks 
Once graph is converted into a number traditional secret sharing schemes, as 
mentioned in the Section 1, can be applied. When this is done secret shares are 
standard “number-like” shares. In the time of the secret recovery they are pooled 
together using standard combiner algorithm. Resulting secret number is converted 
again into the graph as described in the Section 3.3. 
 We claim that presented conversion method comforts the requirements for  
as stated in the Section 2: 
( )GM
− it is injective under condition that order of vertices is predefined; 
− both M  and  are easy to compute ( )G ( )mM '
− is surjective when all graph configurations are permitted. 
Once graph is converted into the number it can be shared using available secret 
sharing schemes. In order to maintain information theoretical properties of the secret 
sharing scheme (e.g. perfectness , see [18], [19]), one needs to carefully examine the 
space of possible  values. In many instances size of the space of possible  
values will be smaller then cardinality of all numbers with 
m m
m  digits. If this fact is 
not taken to account security of the secret sharing protocols can be significantly 
weakened.  
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Example 2 
Consider set of connected graphs. As proposed in order to describe connected graph 
on V  vertices, one needs ( )VΓ=m  bits. The secret space is clearly much smaller, 
because all strings representing non-connected graphs need to be excluded. 
Adversary trying to guess the secret will have task much easier then checking all 
possible numbers with length m  digits.     ■ 
The third requirement for  can be relaxed under two conditions: ( )GM
a. knowing restrictions of the graph G , the space of possible  values should be 
described. Properties (eg., perfectness) of underlying number based scheme 
should be derived and analyzed for that space. 
m
b. when  is computed, resulting graph  should be checked whether it 
comforts imposed restriction. 
( )mM ' G
If stated above conditions are properly applied resulting secret sharing scheme will 
not weaken properties of underlying number based scheme. There is also the other 
side of the coin, the restrictions allow for some added value. In the Section 5 we 
outline how to use them towards building extended capabilities into the secret 
sharing scheme. 
 4. SHARING GRAPH PROPERTIES 
We use graph vertex coloring to illustrate how to share graph properties. Further in 
the section we assume (unless stated otherwise), that for the given graph G finding 
its coloring is hard to compute. By hard we mean lack of polynomial algorithm for 
the problem, see [17].  
 4.1 Vertex coloring for graphs with unknown structure 
As described in the section 3.2 vertex coloring of the graph G can be written as the 
vector a11 a22 ...amm  with entries from main diagonal of the matrix A. Again, taking 
into account that any vector is possible (when any graph configuration is acceptable 
and graph structure is not known), all secret sharing methods suitable to share 
number can be applied.  
When underlying secret sharing scheme is perfect, non-disclosure rule is supported. 
This results from the definition of perfectness, that participants obtain no 
information on the secret from their shares, till the recovery of the secret. 
In above construction the only information available, when the secret is recovered, is 
the coloring of the graph G. 
It should be emphasized that, in a general case, one can share only partitioning 
graph’s vertices into n sets (proper -coloring for the graph), where , not 
a particular color-to-vertex assignment. It is due to the fact, that any secret 
participant can modify his share by adding component-wise a constant to every digit 
in the number. In such a case:  
n )(Gn χ=
− a particular color-to-vertex assignment will be modified, 
 6 
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− the partitioning graph’s vertices into n sets (proper n-coloring for the graph) can 
remain valid. 
As the result this attack works when the secret is any minimal vertex coloring of the 
graph. This is the case when secret is solution to some problem and multiple 
solutions are permitted. Tampering with the secret shares by the participants does 
not result in any damage as long as recovered secret is valid minimal coloring of the 
graph. An instance of such problem will be presented in the Section 5. 
 When there is need to share particular color to vertex assignment, then the method 
to verify shares consistency needs to be added. This problem can be address by 
mean of Verifiable Secret Sharing, see [18]. 
In some special cases custom solutions can be designed, as discussed next. 
 4.2 Vertex coloring for graphs with known structure 
When graph structure is known similar method to one described above can be used. 
However one should note that information contained in the graph structure severely 
limits the secret space. The particular secret space needs to be individually 
examined. Although approach outlined in the preceding section works, there are also 
other options to be considered. An interesting approach is presented in [14]. In this 
case assumption, that for the given graph G finding its coloring is hard, is inverted. 
Actually method is based on the fact that in some cases graph’s vertices can be 
partitioned into different types depending on coloring properties. In such case it is 
relatively easy to find proper minimal coloring, but finding particular color to vertex 
assignment still can be difficult. The idea is to separately share information on 
vertices belonging to the different types of coloring sets. Only proper combination of 
secret resulting from the different types of coloring sets allows to recover particular 
vertex coloring of the graph G. As the result:  
− sharing of single secret is turned into the series of combinatorial problems, that 
are easy for quantitative analysis; 
− information theoretical properties can be derived and proof of security can be 
stated; 
− method provides opportunity to share multiple secrets within same scheme. 
Since graph structure is assumed to be known hence discussion of non-disclosure 
rule boils down to careful analysis of information theoretical properties (i.e. how 
much information about particular coloring is released when some of the secrets are 
recovered). 
Authors considered adoption of this method for the graphs with unknown structure. 
Unfortunately revealing information about partition of the graphs into types of 
coloring sets leaks information on the graph structure. Yet, it seems possible to 
design computationally secure scheme. This line of research was stopped, because 
on the ground of information theory such scheme will be always considered weaker, 
then perfect one. Nevertheless it cannot be ruled out that demand for such solution 
will appear, resulting from some other consideration (e.g. extended capabilities). 
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 5. ON GRAPH RELATED PROBLEMS, THAT ARE 
USEFUL IN SECRET SHARING  
Graph theory provides us with variety of interesting problems, many of which are 
known to be of NP class (e.g., [9], [17]). Few instance are: graph coloring, graph 
isomorphism and Hamiltonian path. 
In this section we provide examples, how to use some of these problems in secret 
sharing, with special emphasize on extended capabilities.  It is interesting to note 
that often secret sharing is simultaneously applied to both  structure and graph 
related property.  In such case non-disclosure principle is used to manage interaction 
between this two. 
 5.1 Graph coloring and Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) 
Soon after secret sharing schemes emerged, it has been realized that they were 
vulnerable to misbehaving protocol parties. Verification was introduced to protect 
against cheating participants, for instance see [21]. Unfortunately, usually it comes 
at the price. This fact is related to the paradox stated by David Chaum, that no 
system can simultaneously provide privacy and integrity.  
 At ESORICS2002 in Zurich a verification method that works for any underlying 
secret sharing scheme was described ([16]). It is based on the concept of verification 
sets of participants, related to an authorized set of participants. The participants 
interact (with no third party involvement) in order to check validity of their shares 
before they are pooled for secret recovery. Verification efficiency does not depend 
on the number of faulty participants. One of the pillars of the method is the use of a 
proper verification function; a very promising one results from the graph coloring 
check-digit scheme described in [13]. This proposal requires conversion of the given 
number into a graph and checking its vertex coloring on both sides of the 
communication channel. The quantitative argument presented shows that the 
feasibility of the proposed scheme increases with the size of the number whose 
digits are checked, as well as, overall probability of digits errors. 
Joining both results ([16], [13]) produces a graph-based shares verification method, 
which was less formally described in [15]. The method depends heavily on graph 
coloring properties that in turn are handy in the formal security analysis. To some 
extent it seems even to bypass (or at least weaken) the Chaum paradox. In the case 
of the described method one does not get a free lunch, but at least can have a free 
starter. 
In the limiting case, combining verification with graph coloring check-digit , 
approaches idea of zero-knowledge argument (e.g.,[18]). It has been shown that 
every NP problem can be converted in to zero-knowledge proof (see, [6]). These 
observations enable us to draw conclusion that other graph related problems, with 
already constructed zero-knowledge proofs (for instance graph isomorphism), can be 
adapted for the shares verification method. 
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 5.2 Restrictions on  based Verifiable Secret Sharing   ( )GM
The idea is straightforward. Consider sharing graph , as described in the Section 
3.4. Further assume that some restrictions (e.g. connectivity) are imposed on  . 
Verification comes after secret  is recovered. Prior to use its validity is tested 
using mapping . If  maps into permitted graph type, then recovered 
secret can be valid. 
G
G
m( )m( )mM ' M '
Probabilistic verification protocol of this type was described in [16].  
Proposal stated in this paragraph can be extended to use restrictions on G and 
related mappings as the verification function for approach outlined in [16]. 
 5.3 Public-key cryptosystems 
In [8] Koblitz describes public-key cryptosystem “Polly Cracker”, that uses graph 3-
coloring . For his implementation the public key is the graph structure, while private 
key is graph 3-coloring. Hence in order to share the private key one has to be able 
share graph coloring.  This very much the case described in the Section 4. 
In addition, the fact, that any proper 3-coloring of the given graph can be a private 
key, yields greater flexibility when comes to construction of authorized sets of 
participant and resulting access structure (see [19]). 
Whole problem was described and analyzed in [14]. 
 5.4. Multi-secret schemes 
 Separate sharing of graph structure and it’s properties, when combined in one 
protocol, allows to build multi-secret scheme. It provides different authorized sets of 
participants with different secrets. For instance, one set can recover the structure of 
the graph, while the other assignment of colors to the vertices. Only, when both 
groups cooperate graph together with vertex coloring can be obtained. Once 
hierarchy of graph properties is established, it can be turned into multi-secret 
threshold schemes (e.g., [18]). In such scheme, the greater number of participants 
cooperate, the more information about the graph can be recovered. For instance, 
consider DNA molecule. There are at least 4 levels on which that structure can be 
described, starting from the number of particular nucleotides (1st level structure) up 
the way that whole helix is folded (4th level structure). One can design a 4-
thresholds scheme that links the number of participants taking part in the protocol 
with the level of DNA structure that they can recover.  
 6. FROM NUMBERS TO GRAPHS  
Till now we were concerned with sharing objects of graph type. In preceding 
sections it was demonstrated that such objects can introduce additional features in 
secret sharing.  
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This leads to the question whether existing secret sharing schemes can benefit from 
those features? To describe problem by mean of example, can we use VSS, 
described above, for secret shares consisting of ordinary numbers? In other words, 
can we go the other way around and share a number the same way as a graph? 
In general context, answer to this questions is positive, provided proper mapping 
from numbers to graphs is found. 
It is nothing different from  discussed in the Section 2.  In practice both 
mappings  and  are needed. This requirement comes from the 
expected mode of operation: 
( )mM '
( )m( )mM ' M
− number will be converted into a graph  using ; G ( )mM '
− some operations will be performed on G   in order to support additional 
features/extended capabilities; 
− resulting graph (say ) has to be converted into the number again. 'G
Natural way on conversion is to use  as defined in the Section 2. Special care 
has to be take for injective property of the mapping , as discussed in the 
Remark 1. The sample list of the benefits can be found in [16].  
( )mM
( )GM
 7. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH  
In the paper it was demonstrated how to share the secret, that is, a graph. Conversion 
into a number allows the use any of existing secret sharing schemes. Information 
theoretical capabilities for the chosen scheme should be preserved, provided that 
properties of  hold. New possibilities resulting from graph properties can be 
also applied to secrets that are numbers.  
( )GM
Further research will concentrate on: 
− optimizing the conversion methods, 
− working on more applications of graph properties to secret sharing and their 
applications to other objects , 
− formulation of the results in the Information Theory language, 
− searching for alternative methods to share secret that is a graph. 
Last one is really challenging task, because will allow to set new paradigms in secret 
sharing. The most promising are: visual cryptography methods and applications of 
the random graphs.  
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